Approved For Release 2009/03/31: CIA-RDP83M00914R000600110013-4 **EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT** Routing Slip TO: **ACTION** INFO DATE INITIAL DCy -BOCI 3 EXDIR D/ICS 5 DDI DDA DDO DDS&T Chm/NIC 10 GC 11 IG 12 Compt .13 D/EE0 14 D/Pers 15 D/0EA 16 C/PAD/OEA 17 SA/IA 18 AO/DCI 19 C/IPD/OIS 20 21 22 SUSPENSE Date Remarks: NSC review completed. 3637 (10-81)

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220

82-12172/1

September 29, 1982

UNCLASSIFIED (WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE

THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE

THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT

AND BUDGET

CHAIRMAN, COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS

ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR

POLICY DEVELOPMENT

UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

ADMINISTRATOR, AID

SUBJECT

Senior Interdepartmental Group on International Economic Policy (SIG-IEP)

Attached please find the minutes from the SIG-IEP meeting held September 28.

David E. Pickford Executive Secretary

Attachment

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SENIOR INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP--INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY

September 28, 1982 1:30 p.m. Roosevelt Room

Attendees:

Treasury

Secretary Regan (Chairman)

Marc Leland

State

James L. Buckley Elinor G. Constable

Defense

Secretary Caspar Weinberger

Fred Ikle

Agriculture

Secretary John R. Block

Commerce

Secretary Malcolm Baldrige

Lionel Olmer

CIA

Office of the Vice President

Donald Gregg

OMB

Joseph Wright Alton Keel

CEA

Geoffrey Carliner

OPD

Edwin T. Harper Roger Porter

AID

M. Peter McPherson

NSC

Henry Nau Paula Dobriansky

William Martin

Norman Bailey (Executive Secretary)

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<u>Ambassador David Macdonald</u> Dennis Whitfield

The Chairman opened the meeting by reviewing the status of Polish debt. The USG and other governmental creditors continue to press for payment due under the 1981 rescheduling; however, Polish sanctions prohibit entering into discussions on 1982 debt. It was agreed that the SIG-IEP would not recommend any change in U.S. policy. This issue may be considered again following consultations with other governmental creditors in late October.

The next agenda item was a proposal for a Presidential Commission on Private Sector Assistance to Poland. This initiative would allow the U.S. private sector to render assistance to the Polish private sector -- with primary emphasis on agriculture. It was agreed that there is merit in continuing humanitarian relief to the Polish people -- however, any new initiative at this time would have to be carefully considered. First, we would need to consult closely with our allies so that any actions are not

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misinterpreted. Second, we need assurances that aid reaches the Polish people directly without passing through Polish government hands. Third, we need to check with the private sector to see if they would support such a program. It was agreed that this issue deserved more study and responsibility for follow-up was given to the IG-IEP. AID agreed to pull together statistics on total U.S. private and public aid to Poland.

The last agenda item was a review of U.S.-Indian economic relations. In order to safeguard important political and security interests at stake in U.S. relations with India, the President has directed the SIG-IEP to explore ways in which the United States might support in its development efforts. A consensus was reached that (1) in the short-term, we should focus on multilateral assistance and how the U.S. should fulfill its commitment to higher levels of MDB hard window borrowing; and (2) over the longer term, we should take steps now to foster an economic relationship based more on expanding commercial ties and less on aid. It was agreed that we should continue to consult at Ministerial level and fully use the already established Joint Commission. While the Group was sensitive to the need to improve economic ties with India following a positive heads of state meeting, it was recognized that the problems in doing so are formidable.

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